The States Can Wait: The Immediate
Appealability of Orders Denying Eleventh
Amendment Immunity
Jack W. Pirozzolot
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits federal courts from taking jurisdiction over suits brought
against a state by citizens of other states or of foreign nations.1
According to the Supreme Court, the amendment embodies a
broad constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity.2 The
correct characterization of this immunity, however, remains unclear. Is it a right not to stand trial or is it merely a defense to
liability?
This question becomes important when a state tries to appeal
immediately from a denial of a motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds. A state will seek immediate review
of such an interlocutory order because a reversal would dispose of
the case and save the cost of lengthy"proceedings in the trial court.
Unfortunately for states, federal law generally prohibits immediate
appellate review of interlocutory orders.3 Because appeals from interlocutory orders can create piecemeal litigation, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the final judgment rule prohibits
immediate review of an interlocutory order unless it is a "collateral
order."
Under the collateral order exception to the final judgment
rule, a state may appeal immediately from a denial of a motion to
dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds only if the immunity gives the state a right not to stand trial. If it gives the state
merely a defense to liability, the state must await final judgment
before appealing.
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'

The full text provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-

strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
US Const, Amend XI.
2 Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 13-15 (1890). See generally David P. Currie, Sovereign
Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 S Ct Rev 149.
3 28 USC § 1291 (1988) (final judgment rule).
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The Supreme Court has not decided whether Eleventh
Amendment immunity is a right not to stand trial or just a defense
to liability. 4 It has held, however, that some personal immunities

represent a right not to stand trial. According to the Court, double
jeopardy immunity, Speech or Debate Clause immunity, and absolute and qualified immunity for public officials each exist to protect individuals from the burdens of litigation. For this reason, the
Court characterizes each of these immunities as a right not to
stand trial, and therefore allows immediate appellate review of a
denial of a motion to dismiss based on any one of these
immunities.
Lower courts currently divide over whether this case law controls the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Most of the
lower courts believe that it does. They find no relevant distinction
between Eleventh Amendment immunity and personal immunities.
One court, however, disagrees and argues that none of the policy
,concerns that justify immediate appealability in the personal immunity context exist in the Eleventh Amendment immunity context. It has held that the Eleventh Amendment does not give the
states a right to avoid trial.
This Comment attempts to resolve the question of immediate
appealability by examining the proper characterization of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. It concludes that Eleventh Amendment
immunity serves merely as a defense to liability. For this reason, a
state should not be allowed to appeal immediately from a denial of
a motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.
Section I of this Comment surveys the two bodies of case law
relevant to this issue. First, it outlines the requirements for appellate jurisdiction, discussing both the final judgment rule and the
collateral order doctrine. Then it reviews the characteristics of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Section II describes what' happens when these two bodies of case law meet by discussing two
cases that illustrate the competing approaches taken by the lower
courts. Section III addresses the Supreme Court's personal immunity decisions and concludes that these decisions should not apply
to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
' To date, all Supreme Court cases construing the amendment have involved state parties that had appealed from an adverse judgment and so the Court has not had the opportunity to resolve this question.
I Abney v United States, 431 US 651, 662 (1977) (double jeopardy); Helstoski v Meanor, 442 US 500, 507-08 (1979) (Speech or Debate Clause immunity); Nixon v Fitzgerald,
457 US 731, 742-43 (1982) (absolute immunity); Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 511, 526-27
(1985) (qualified immunity of public officials).
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Section IV proposes the proper characterization of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. By examining three aspects of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, this Section suggests that Eleventh
Amendment immunity does little more than protect state treasuries from paying compensatory judgments. For this reason, this Section concludes that the immunity is properly considered a defense
to liability and not a right to avoid trial.

I.

THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK

In large part, the dispute over the proper characterization of
Eleventh Amendment immunity reflects a growing tension between
appellate jurisdiction and Eleventh Amendment case law. On the
one hand, the Court has tried to minimize interlocutory appeals of
court orders by beefing up the final judgment rules and limiting
the scope of the collateral order doctrine.' On the other hand, the
Court has expanded the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity
by making it more difficult for private citizens to sue states.
A.

Appellate Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts
1.

The final judgment rule.

The question at issue in this Comment typically arises when a
state is sued and moves to dismiss, claiming immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. If the trial court denies the motion and the
state files an immediate appeal, an appellate court's jurisdiction
depends on the requirements of the final judgment rule. Title 28,
section 1291 grants appellate courts jurisdiction over "all final decisions." Although the precise definition is unclear, courts agree
that a "final decision" by a district court "leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment."9 Any order that disposes of
the case on the merits (for example, an order granting summary
judgment or an order dismissing the case) qualifies as a final decision. Generally, an order that does not make a final determination
on the merits does not qualify. Under this rule, if a party does not

6

The rule provides: "The courts of appeals... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from

all final decisions of the district courts of the United States. .. " 28 USC § 1291. See also
Coopers & Lybrand v Livesay, 437 US 463, 477 (1978) ("the fact that an interlocutory order
may induce a party to abandon his claim before final judgment is not a sufficient reason for
considering it a 'final decision' within the meaning of § 1291").
See, for example, Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,337 US 541, 54647 (1949).
5 28 USC § 1291.
9 Catlin v United States, 324 US 229, 233 (1945).
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like an order issued by a district court, but the order does not dispose of the action, the party must wait for a decision on the merits
before appealing.
This rule protects litigants and the courts from the costs of
piecemeal litigation. Underlying the rule is the judgment that allowing piecemeal appeals would impose greater social costs than
forcing litigants to proceed to the end of a case, only to find out
that it need never have been litigated or that it must be litigated
all over again. 10
Of course the benefits of immediate appeals from interlocutory
rulings do sometimes strongly outweigh their costs. For this reason,
the final judgment rule does not absolutely bar immediate review
of interlocutory rulings; there are some statutory exceptions.11 But
because the requirements for each of these exceptions are so stringent, the exceptions are unavailable to most litigants"2 -including
states appealing from a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
2. The collateral order doctrine.
Although the Supreme Court did not have to recognize any
exceptions beyond those contained in statutes, it did. In the 1949
case of Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,3 the
Court carved a narrow exception to the final judgment rule called
the "collateral order doctrine." In Cohen, the Court determined
that there was a "small class" of district court decisions which, although not the last possible order, involved a right separable from
and collateral to the rights asserted in the action, and which were
too important to be denied review and too independent to force
the party involved to wait until final adjudication. 4 Appellate
courts can exercise their jurisdiction over appeals from such "collateral orders."
Under the collateral order doctrine, an appellate court can assert jurisdiction over an intermediate order only if it satisfies a
three-pronged test.' 5 First, the order must conclusively determine
the disputed question; second, it must resolve a question com10 See

Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 550-53 (Little Brown, 3d ed 1986).
11See, for example, 28 USC § 1292 (1988) (providing for immediate appeals from district court orders granting or dissolving injunctions and appointing receivers); 28 USC §
1651 (1988) (providing for writs of mandamus).
12 See Comment, Immediate Appealability of Minimum Contact Defenses: How Far
Does the Cohen Doctrine Extend?, 63 Tulane L Rev 913, 916 (1989).
'3 337 US 541.
14

Id at 546.

15

Coopers & Lybrand, 437 US at 468.
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pletely separate from the merits of the action; and third, it must
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment. 16 As
the collateral order doctrine has evolved, the third prong has become the most important.
Under the current formulation of the collateral order doctrine,
the crucial issue is whether the order affects a right that cannot be
vindicated on appeal from a final judgment. If not, the appellate
court has no jurisdiction over an immediate appeal from that order. Because most orders affect rights that can be vindicated on
appeal from a final judgment, the collateral order doctrine gives
defendants little hope that an appellate court will hear an appeal
from an interlocutory order. In fact, there have probably been as
many law review articles written about the doctrine as cases allowing appeals based on it. 17
Despite the narrow scope of the collateral order doctrine, the
Supreme Court has allowed immediate appeals from orders denying a motion to dismiss based on some personal immunities. For
example, the Court has allowed an interlocutory appeal from an
order denying a defendant double jeopardy immunity,' and from
an order denying Speech or Debate Clause immunity." It also has
held that denials of both qualified and absolute immunity for public officials (both personal immunities) are immediately appealable. 0 In each of these cases the Court allowed an immediate appeal
because the essence of each immunity defense was an "entitlement
not to be forced to litigate."'" Obviously, courts cannot vindicate
such an entitlement if the defendant must wait until after the litigation to appeal. Thus, when a trial court rejects a defense that
constitutes a right not to stand trial, the defendant can appeal
from that decision immediately.
Unfortunately for defendants, very few defenses amount to a
right not to stand trial, and the Supreme Court has limited the use
of the collateral order doctrine to cases where that right is clearly

16Id.
17 Luther T. Munford, Dangers, Toils, and Snares: Appeals Before FinalJudgment, 15
Litigation 18 (Spring 1989).
" Abney, 431 US at 662; US Const, Amend V ("nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
" Helstoski, 442 US at 507-08; US Const, Art I, § 6 ("for any Speech or Debate in
either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
Place").
Nixon, 457 US at 742-43; Mitchell, 472 US at 526-27.
Mitchell, 472 US at 527.
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at stake.22 Apparently, the Court believes that unless it limits the
range of defenses that can be described as a right not to stand
trial, the collateral order doctrine would swallow the final judgment rule. The Court has been especially sensitive to this in recent
to characterize various defenses as
years, repeatedly declining
23
rights not to stand trial.
Two cases are particularly noteworthy. One involves a claim of
immunity from process; 24 and one involves a jurisdictional defense. 25 According to the Court, these defenses provide a defendant
only with the right not to be subject to the binding judgment of a
particular forum and not a right to avoid trial in that forum. 2' As
will be discussed in Section IV, these two cases provide a helpful
framework for determining whether ,the Eleventh Amendment represents a right not to stand trial.
B.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

While the Court has taken a very narrow view of the collateral
order doctrine, it has taken an expansive view of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment protects states from
suits by private citizens in federal courts. Drafted in order to overturn the controversial Supreme Court opinion in Chisholm v Georgia, 7 the text of the Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
22 Other orders that have passed the Cohen test include orders directing the defendant

to pay costs of notice in a class action, Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin,417 US 156 (1974), and
orders denying a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Roberts v District Court, 339 US 844
(1950). See Comment, The Immediate Appealability of Rule 11 Sanctions, 59 Geo Wash L
Rev 683, 692 (1991).
22 These include a denial of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum, United States
v Ryan, 402 US 530 (1971); orders refusing to certify a class, Coopers & Lybrand, 437 US at
468-69; and orders denying a motion to disqualify an attorney, Richardson-MerrellInc. v
Koller, 472 US- 424 (1985); Firestone Tire & Rubber v Risjord, 449 US 368 (1981). One
commentator has described the collateral order doctrine as a "dying doctrine." Munford, 15
Litigation at 19 (cited in note 17).
24 Van Cauwenberghe v Biard, 486 US 517, 526-27 (1988).
25 Catlin, 324 US at 236.
28 Van Cauwenberghe, 486 US at 526-27.
2 2 US (2 Dal) 419 (1793). Chisholm's holding-that a state could be held liable, without its consent, by a citizen of another state or a citizen of a foreign country-shocked the
states and, in response, they passed the Eleventh Amendment to reinstate the original
meaning of Article III. Hans, 134 US at 11, 15 (1890) ("the cognizance of suits [against the
states] ... was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power
of the United States"); Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 93101 (Little Brown, 1922). A number of commentators have criticized the theory that the
Eleventh Amendment reinstated the original Article III meaning. See, for example, John J.
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
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suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."2" Later, the Court moved beyond the
language of the amendment to hold that the federal judicial power
did not extend even to a suit by a citizen against his own state. 29 In
this manner, the Eleventh Amendment is said to reinstate the general view before Chisholm-that a state could not be sued without
its consent."
Two competing policy considerations underlie Eleventh
Amendment doctrine. The first concerns the proper relationship
between the federal and state governments. Eleventh Amendment
doctrine has developed on the premise that the states entered the
union with their sovereignty intact. 1 Their sovereignty limits the
judicial power of the federal government such that private plaintiffs cannot sue a state in federal court unless the state has consented-either explicitly or in the "plan of the convention" (that
is, to the extent each of the states may have given up some sovereignty as a condition of entering the Union). 2
Competing against state sovereignty, however, is a second policy concern: protecting individual rights. Since the Civil War
Amendments, a major premise of the federal system is that the
federal government will protect individuals against abusive state
governments. 3 A broad constitutional principle of state sovereign
immunity would make this very difficult. It would prevent federal
jurisdiction over cases brought by private citizens against states
even where states had violated federal constitutional rights.

83 Colum L Rev 1889, 1895-1920 (1983). The Supreme Court, however, continues to embrace it. See Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 662 (1974).
8 US Const, Amend XI.
",Hans, 134 US at 1. See also Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 149 (cited in note 2) (contending that the Court was influenced by the "spirit" of the amendment).
1oSee Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1894-95 (cited in note 27) (describing the legal
literature that has presented this view).
11 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this view in Blatchford v Native Village of
Noatuk and Circle Village, 111 S Ct 2578, 2581 (1991). See also Welch v Texas Dep't of
Highways and Public Transportation,483 US 468, 472 (1987).
3' Principalityof Monaco v Mississippi, 292 US 313, 328-29 (1934). In other situations,
of course, states can be compelled to defend themselves in federal court. See US Const, Art

III, § 2 (allowing federal jurisdiction over controversies between states).
33 Congress can abrogate the immunity pursuant to its powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 456 (1976) ("We think that Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.").
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Current Eleventh Amendment doctrine reflects a compromise
between these two competing considerations. In order to protect
proper federal-state relations, the Court defines the immunity as a
limitation on the reach of the federal judicial power. So defined,
Eleventh Amendment immunity looks like a type of jurisdictional
34
bar, and the Court has referred to it as one.
In order to vindicate federal rights, the Court has shaped
Eleventh Amendment doctrine in two ways. First, the Court has
held that Congress can abrogate the immunity under the powers
given to it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 5 Apparently, although the Eleventh Amendment limits judicial power, it does not
equally limit legislative power. The immunity does not bar Congressional attempts to create and vindicate federal rights so long as
Congress clearly indicates in the text of the statute an intention to
abrogate the states' immunity.
Second, the Court has created the Ex parte Youngs6 fiction,
allowing plaintiffs to avoid Eleventh Amendment immunity by
naming a state official as a defendant rather than the state itself.
The Young fiction says that whenever a state official tries to enforce an unconstitutional statute he is "stripped of his official' or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. ' ' 7" Therefore, any suit against
him to enjoin his enforcement of an unconstitutional statute is a
suit against the individual state officer and, more importantly, not
a suit against the state.3 8 Although for some time before Young,
the Court had recognized actions for damages against state officials

See Edelman, 415 US at 678 ("the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court"). It
has some of the characteristics of a subject-matter jurisdiction bar. For example, failure to
raise it as a defense does not result in waiver, and a state can raise it even in a collateral
attack on a judgment for want of jurisdiction. See Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 168 (cited in
note 2). However, it also has some characteristics of a personal jurisdiction bar. For instance, the state can waive the immunity. See Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436, 447-48 (1883).
11 Fitzpatrick, 427 US at 456.
36 209 US 123 (1908).
31 Id at 160.
11 Thus, Young created the anomalous result that the official's conduct qualified as
state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, but not for the purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment.
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in tort, 9 Young was the first case in which the Court recognized a
"general basis for prospective relief against state officials. ' 40
Perhaps because the Young fiction threatened to reduce sovereign immunity merely to a matter of form, 41 the Court limited its
4 2 the Court barred suits of "private
scope. In Edelman v Jordan,
parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury." Under Edelman, sovereign immunity protects the state if the suit against it essentially looks to recover money from the state. 43 The Court explained that the
Eleventh Amendment allows suits seeking prospective relief, such
as injunctions, but does not allow suits seeking retrospective relief,
which the Court defined as compensation for past injury to be paid
out of the state treasury.
By cutting back on the scope of the Young fiction, the Supreme Court gave a heightened deference to federalism concerns.
Still, Edelman did not completely discount the concern for individual rights. It very much represents a compromise solution.
Under Edelman, the Amendment protects states from paying compensatory judgments, but it allows suits to enjoin states from engaging in unconstitutional conduct.
II.

WHEN THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE MEETS THE COLLATERAL
ORDER DOCTRINE

Courts have disagreed over what happens when the Eleventh
Amendment meets the collateral order doctrine. Perhaps because
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence insufficiently guides the

39 For example, a citizen could sue to recover specific property wrongfully seized by
state officials. Osborn v Bank of the United States, 22 US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824) (ordering
the return of a large sum of money seized from the bank and kept separately in a trunk).
40 Peter Low and John Jeffries, Federal Courts and The Law of Federal State Relations 814 n a (Foundation, 1989).
41 Until Edelman, one might have considered sovereign immunity as a merely procedural hurdle-having no effect unless the plaintiff names the state, regardless of whether
the state is the real party in interest. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,96
Yale L J 1425, 1479 (1987) (prior to Edelman, sovereign immunity could have been construed as simply a matter of politeness).
42 415 US at 663.
" William Fletcher has described the Edelman doctrine as follows: "Edelman thus suggests that the modern version of Ex parte Young consists of three interrelated propositions:
Prospective prophylactic injunctive relief against individual state officers is permitted; retroactive relief that compensates a plaintiff for harm already done is prohibited; and monetary
awards against state officers that 'must inevitably come from the state treasury' are prohibited." William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation Of The Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant Of JurisdictionRather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction,35 Stan L Rev 1033, 1120 (1983), citing Edelman, 415 US at 665.
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proper characterization of the immunity,44 courts have split over
whether it gives the states a right not to stand trial or whether it is
a defense to liability. Disagreement over this issue has led some
lower courts to divide over whether a denial of a motion to dismiss
is immediately appealable as a collateral order. The majority position, first articulated by the Second Circuit in Minotti v Lensink,
holds that the immunity gives the states a right not to stand trial.
The minority position, as articulated by the First Circuit in Libby
v Marshall, holds that the immunity merely gives the states a defense to liability.
A.

The Majority View: Minotti v Lensink

The first case to raise the issue of immediate appealability of a
5
denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity was Minotti v Lensink.4
Minotti, a former Connecticut state employee, had brought an action for damages under § 1983 naming the Acting Commissioner of
4
the Department of Mental Retardation as the sole defendant.
Minotti alleged that employees of the Connecticut Department of
Mental Retardation had tried to involve him in an attempt to defraud the United States and had fired him because he refused to
participate. The Commissioner moved to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds. Holding that Connecticut had
waived its immunity, the district court denied the motion to dismiss. The Commissioner appealed. The Second Circuit held that
an immediate appeal from such an order was appropriate.4 7
The Second Circuit did not draw from Eleventh Amendment
precedents for this holding. Instead, the court relied on the Supreme Court's personal immunity decisions, in particular Mitchell
v Forsyth,4 8 where the Court held that a denial of a government
official's claim of qualified immunity is immediately appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. In Minotti, the Second Circuit
equated Eleventh Amendment immunity with the qualified immunity for government officials at issue in Mitchell. The court reasoned that "the essence of the [Eleventh Amendment] immunity is
the possessor's right not to be haled into court-a right that cannot be vindicated after trial. ' 49 For that reason, the Second Circuit

44
45

See note 4 and accompanying text.
798 F2d 607 (2d Cir 1986).

46 Id

at 608.

47 Id.
48

472 US 511 (1985).

4'

Minotti, 798 F2d at 608.
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allowed the appeal.5 0 Since Minotti, five other circuits have embraced its reasoning explicitly, and one has done so implicitly. 51
B.

The Minority View: Libby v Marshall

The First Circuit has taken a different approach to the problem and has reached the opposite result. In Libby v Marshall,2 the
court held that a denial of a motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds was not immediately appealable as
a collateral order. Libby arose out of a § 1983 class action suit
brought by Massachusetts state prisoners against the Governor of
Massachusetts and a number of other state officials. The district
court denied a motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. The state defendants, relying on Mitchell, argued
that they should be able to appeal immediately.5 3
The First Circuit disagreed. It began its opinion with the observation that the general concept of immunity contains no "talismanic significance" that invariably triggers a right to interlocutory
appeal. The personal immunity cases had merely shown that an
immediate appeal would lie only if the underlying purpose of the
Eleventh Amendment immunity gave the state defendants a right
not to stand trial. Beyond that, the personal immunity cases were
irrelevant.
The First Circuit distinguished the personal immunity issues
in Mitchell, Nixon, and Abney from state sovereign immunity. The
defendants in Libby had tried to claim immunity under the Eleventh Amendment by arguing that the inmates had sued them in
50 Minotti was reaffirmed in Eng v Coughlin, 858 F2d 889, 894 (2d Cir 1988) ("Like
qualified official immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, as a type of absolute immunity, embraces not only protection from liability but also protection from proceeding to
trial."), in United States v Yonkers Board of Education, 893 F2d 498, 502 (2d Cir 1990)
("The denial of a motion to dismiss claims on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity,
though technically an interlocutory decision, may be appealable.., as a collateral order that
is final within the meaning of [the final order doctrine].") and again in Dube v State University of New York, 900 F2d 587, 594 (2d Cir 1990) ("the denial of a motion to dismiss
claims on absolute Eleventh Amendment Immunity is immediately appealable").
51 Chrissy v Mississippi Dep't of Public Welfare, 925 F2d 844, 848-49 (5th Cir 1991);
Kroll v Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 934 F2d 904, 906 (7th Cir 1991);
Schopler v Bliss, 903 F2d 1373, 1376-78 (11th Cir 1990); Loya v Texas Dep't of Corrections,
878 F2d 860, 861 (5th Cir 1989); Barnes v State of Missouri, 960 F2d 63 (8th Cir 1992);
Durning v Citibank, 950 F2d 1419 (9th Cir 1991); Coakley v Welch, 877 F2d 304, 305 (4th
Cir 1989) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment issue was appealable as a collateral order
without referring to Mitchell or Minotti).
62 833 F2d 402, 405 (1st Cir 1987).

Id at 403-04.
Id at 405.
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their official capacity (which was true) and that, as a result, the
suit was really against the state. But since the suit was against the
state, the state officials did not have to worry about being liable
personally. For this reason, the First Circuit believed that the
Mitchell concerns about distracting officials from their duties and
deterring people from entering public service did not exist.
The court then examined the interests uriderlying the Eleventh Amendment immunity and argued that the Eleventh Amendment is not really an immunity at all. It is "analytically more akin
to a bar for lack of subject matter jurisdiction than to a true immunity. '5 1 Since it is well settled that a district court's denial of a
motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds is not a "final decision," and hence not immediately appealable as a collateral order,
the court believed that a trial court's Eleventh Amendment ruling,
to the degree it resembles a jurisdictional ruling, is not an appealable final decision.5 6
In further support of this position, the court cited the Young
fiction. The First Circuit believed that to say that the "essence of
sovereign immunity is an immunity from trial itself, is to overlook
the reality of the [Young] exception to the Eleventh Amendment."5 The court recognized that whenever a Young-type
case-a suit against an official in his official capacity to remedy a
violation of federal law-is brought, the state still must bear the
burden of litigation.5 8 For example, in a Young-type case the state
will still pay the cost of the litigation. The court believed, therefore, that Eleventh Amendment59 immunity does not protect the
state from the burdens of trial.
Despite its lengthy analysis, the Libby opinion has failed to
convince other courts that denials of motions to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds should not be immediately
appealable.6 0 As has been mentioned, since Libby, five circuits have

55

Id at 406.

51 Id at 406 n 5.
11

Id at 406.

58 Id.
19 At this point the First Circuit's argument seems vulnerable. Apparently, the court
believed that it could identify the purpose of the immunity by citing a case where it did not
apply. If a case falls within a Young-type exception, technically the suit is not against the
state and of course the parties can proceed to trial. In other words, Young-type cases do not
show that a state can be called to trial in a federal court, if, by definition, Young-type suits
are not against the state. As this Comment discusses in Section IV, this objection, though
initially appealing, ignores the practical effects of the Young fiction. See Section IV.C.
60 Two other courts have held that a denial of a motion to dismiss based on Eleventh
Amendment immunity is not immediately appealable. CorporateRisk Management Corp. v
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expressly followed Minotti and one circuit has done so implicitly.6 1
Yet faced with this rising tide of contrary authority, the First Circuit has held firm. In Metcalf & Eddy v Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority,6 2 the First Circuit stated that the other courts
have failed to understand that "the mere incantation of the term
[immunity], without reference to the nature and type of immunity
involved, does not confer a right to an immediate appeal." 63 The
First Circuit believes that the circuits that follow Minotti and
equate the Eleventh Amendment immunity with personal immunities have failed to recognize the significant differences between
Eleventh Amendment immunity and personal immunities.
III. A

COMPARISON OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
WITH PERSONAL IMMUNITIES

The courts that have allowed states immediately to appeal denials of motions to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds have
relied almost exclusively on the rationale that the Supreme Court's
personal immunity cases apply in the Eleventh Amendment immunity context. This Section discusses the personal immunity cases,
and argues that Libby correctly distinguished them from the Eleventh Amendment immunity context.
A.

Personal Immunities and the Collateral Order Doctrine

The Supreme Court has held on four occasions that denials of
certain immunities are immediately appealable. Those include a
claim of immunity under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a claim of
immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause, and claims of either

Solomon, 936 F2d 572 (6th Cir 1991) (unpublished disposition); In re CoordinatedPre-trial
Proceedings in the Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 928 F2d 1136 (9th Cir 1991)
(unpublished disposition). These courts, however, denied appellate jurisdiction for reasons
independent of the question of the proper characterization of the Eleventh Amendment immunity. In Solomon, the Sixth Circuit stated that the Eleventh Amendment gave the states
a right not to stand trial, but it believed that the order did not conclusively determine the
disputed question. For this reason the order failed to meet the first prong of the Colten
doctrine. In Petroleum Products, the Ninth Circuit stated that because the question of
Eleventh Amendment immunity arose as part of a counterclaim, the right not to stand trial
was not at stake. It also suggested that the order was not final because the district court
could reconsider the immunity question. In neither one of these cases did the court suggest
that the Eleventh Amendment did not give states a right not to stand trial.
El See note 51.
' 945 F2d 10 (1st Cir 1991), cert granted by Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 112 S Ct 1290 (1992).
63

Id at 14.
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absolute or qualified immunity for a public official.64 Each of these

immunities confers a right not to stand trial because protecting the
defendant from trial is necessary to achieve the underlying purpose
of each immunity.
1. Double jeopardy.
In Abney v United States,6 5 the Court considered the question

of "whether a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds is a final decision within the
meaning of [§ 1291], and thus immediately appealable."66 Because
the order denying the motion to dismiss did not dispose of the case
on the merits, the Court focused on whether a denial of double
jeopardy immunity fell within the collateral order exception of Cohen. According to the Court, "the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
an individual against more than being subjected to double punishments. It is a guarantee against being twice put to trial for the
same offense.

6' 7

In arriving at this conclusion, the Court stated that the immunity from double jeopardy assures an individual that he will not be
forced "to endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, and
expense of a criminal trial more than once for the same offense.

'68

The immunity acts as a shield from the psychological costs of an
unnecessary trial. Quoting from Justice Black, the Court made
plain that the immunity's purpose
is that the State ...should not be allowed to make repeated

attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty. 9
In order to protect those interests, the Court characterized double
jeopardy immunity as a right not to stand trial.

64 See

note 5.

6- 431 US 651 (1977).
68 Id at 653.
67 Id at 660-61 (emphasis in original).
68 Id at 661.
69 Id at 661-62, quoting Green v United States, 355 US 184, 187-88 (1957).
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Speech or Debate Clause immunity.

In Helstoski v Meanor,7 0 the Court held that an ex-congressman could immediately appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment based on immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. 7 1 The Court stated that the "reasoning undergirding
[Abney] applies with particular force here. 7' 2 Just as double jeopardy immunity protects individuals from the burdens of trial, "the
Speech or Debate Clause was designed to protect Congressmen
'not only from the consequences of the litigation's results but also
from the burden of defending themselves.' ,,73
The Speech or Debate Clause protects a legislator from exposure to questioning for acts done in either House.7 4 The immunity
was not the product of a desire to avoid private lawsuits, but
rather to prevent the executive and judiciary from intimidating
legislators.7 5 Preventing this intimidation was necessary to preserve an independent legislature, and one way to prevent such intimidation was to shield congressmen from any questioning about
their motivations during congressional debates. Although the underlying purposes of Speech or Debate Clause immunity are not
identical to those of double jeopardy immunity, they are similar.
While double jeopardy immunity protects against the actual anxiety of trial, Speech or Debate Clause immunity protects against
the effects that anxiety over trial would have on the legislative process. Although protecting a congressman from the anxiety of trial
is not the ultimate purpose of the immunity, it is crucial to achieving it. For that reason, the Court has characterized the immunity
as a right not to stand trial.
3.

Absolute immunity for public officials.

In Nixon v Fitzgerald,6 the Court confronted the issue of
whether it had jurisdiction over an appeal from a non-final order
in which the district court had rejected the petitioner's claim of
absolute immunity. Absolute immunity gives the government offi-

70
71

442 US 500 (1979).
The Speech or Debate Clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either

House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." US
Const, Art I, § 6.
72 442 US at 506.
73 Id at 508, quoting Dombrowski v Eastland, 387 US 82, 85 (1967).
74 Id.
7'6 United States v Johnson, 383 US 169, 181-82 (1966).
76 457 US 731 (1982).
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cial "inviolability" in civil cases for damages. Drawing on Helstoski, the Court held that the denial of the absolute immunity
defense was immediately appealable.7 Although the Court did not
say so explicitly, the opinion makes clear that absolute immunity
protects interests similar to those that the Speech or Debate
Clause protects. It protects government officials from the burden
of trial in order to improve governmental processes. Without absolute immunity, an executive might hesitate to use his discretion in
ways that might hurt private individuals but that would benefit
the public. The immunity protects the executive officer from the
"apprehension" that his motives may become the subject of a civil
suit. 8
4.

Qualified immunity for public officials.

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing
discretionary functions from civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known. '7 9 In
Mitchell v Forsyth,"' one of the issues before the Court was
whether qualified immunity for public officials gave the public official asserting it the right not to stand trial. In holding that qualified immunity did give the public official a right not to stand trial,
the Court cited Abney, Helstoski and Nixon.
After concluding that the underlying interests of each immunity in those cases included protection from the burdens of trial,
the Court considered whether qualified immunity could be characterized as a right not to stand trial. The Court stated that the underlying policy of qualified immunity was to protect the public interest by giving public officials the freedom to take official action
"with independence and without fear of consequences. ' 81 Because
the threat of a lawsuit would inhibit officials' discretion, would distract them from their duties, and would deter people from entering
public office, the only way to protect against these problems was to
give the officials freedom from both the burdens of potential liability and the burdens of litigation at every stage of the proceed-

'1

Id at 742.

7' Id at 744-45.
Harlow v Fitzgerald,457 US 800, 818 (1982).
472 US 511 (1985).
Id at 525, quoting Harlow, 457 US at 819.
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ings. s2 For that reason, the Court in Mitchell characterized qualified immunity as a right not to stand trial.
5.

Other immunities.

Justice Brennan, who dissented from the judgment in Mitchell, warned that the Court ought to be particularly careful to examine the policies that underlie an immunity before determining
whether it should be seen as a right not to stand trial."3 Since
Mitchell, the Court has recognized Brennan's concerns, refusing to
extend immediate appealability to other immunities that have
come before the Court. The Court has ignored bald claims of immunity from trial and has instead examined "the nature of the
right asserted ... to determine whether an essential aspect of the
claim is the right to be free from the burdens of a trial." 4 With
this concern in mind, courts have held that some types of immunities are not appealable. For example, denials of a motion to dismiss
on grounds of state-action immunity in antitrust law have not been
immediately appealable.8 5 A claim of an immunity on the grounds
of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment86 has also been held
not to be immediately appealable.8 7 As these cases indicate,
whether an immunity is a right not to stand trial will depend on
the policy considerations that underlie the particular immunity.88
B.

Personal Immunities and Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The circuits that have followed Minotti have failed to recognize the way in which the rationale underlying personal immunities limits the applicability of those cases. The personal immunity
cases only support the proposition that Eleventh Amendment immunity represents a right not to stand trial if it has the same underlying interests as the personal immunities. But double jeopardy,

82

Id at 525-26.

8 Id at 551 (Brennan dissenting). Although Justice Brennan expressed this in dissent,

the rationale is consistent with the majority opinion's reasoning. See id at 525-26. Brennan's
disagreement with the majority seems to have been only in the particular application of the
principle.
84 Van Cauwenberghe v Biard, 486 US 517, 525 (1988).
88 Huron Valley Hospital Inc. v City of Pontiac, 792 F2d 563, 567-70 (6th Cir 1986).
But see Commuter TransportationSystems, Inc. v Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 801 F2d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir 1986).
88 US Const, Amend I ("Congress shall make no law ...abridging.., the right of the
people ... to petition the Government for the redress of grievances.").
87 Segni v Commercial Office of Spain, 816 F2d 344, 346 (7th Cir 1987).
88 See text accompanying note 89.
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Speech or Debate Clause, absolute, and qualified immunity are
supported by different policy interests than Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
Eleventh Amendment immunity concerns immunity for the
state. In contrast, the policies underlying the personal immunities
relate to the psychological strain that a lawsuit imposes on the official. These immunities protect against either the anxiety of trial
(Abney) or the effects that the anxiety over trial would have on
proper policymaking (Helstoski, Nixon, and Mitchell). But anxiety
of the kind involved in the personal immunity context does not
exist when an official faces no possibility of personal liability. As
the Seventh Circuit has said in another context, when a state official is sued in his official capacity, he is not "on trial."8' 9 The First
Circuit correctly reasoned, therefore, that the policy concerns in
Mitchell-distraction from official duties and deterring public
service-are largely irrelevant in the Eleventh Amendment immunity context.
Furthermore, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity did not
develop out of a concern that state officials would somehow be distracted from their duties if the state is facing liability. As will be
discussed in Section IV, the Amendment primarily protects the
states from paying out compensatory judgments from their treasuries. It has little to do with protecting the state or its officers from
the distractions of trial.
The personal immunity cases, therefore, do not apply to the
Eleventh Amendment immunity context. By claiming otherwise,
Minotti and its followers have separated the holdings of these
cases from their underlying rationale. If the Eleventh Amendment
immunity is in fact a right not to stand trial, it needs an independent justification. While none of the cases allowing such appeals has
recognized this, the First Circuit has. In a sense, the First Circuit's
view is more consistent with the rationale of the personal immunity cases because it recognizes the need to look at the underlying
interests of an immunity before proclaiming that it includes the
right not to stand trial.

" Scott v Lacy, 811 F2d 1153, 1153-54 (7th Cir 1987) (holding a denial of qualified
immunity in a suit against a public official in his individual capacity appealable despite a
simultaneous claim against the public official in his official capacity).
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CHARACTERIZING THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

Although the Eleventh Amendment immunity may not protect
the same interests as personal immunities, it may nevertheless protect interests that would still be compromised should a state be
forced to go to trial. This Section asks whether an independent
justification exists for allowing an immediate appeal from a denial
of a motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity
grounds. Three areas of current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence indicate that there is none: the history of the amendment;
the notion that the Eleventh Amendment immunity resembles a
jurisdictional bar; and the development of the Young fiction.
Taken together, these elements suggest that requiring a state to
wait until after trial to appeal an adverse ruling on its Eleventh
Amendment claim would not defeat the policy underlying the
Amendment.
A.

The History of the Amendment

The history of the Eleventh Amendment does not automatically control current interpretation of its provisions. Nevertheless,
to the extent that it sheds light on the characterization of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, it suggests that the immunity represents
only a defense to liability. Two episodes in the history of the Eleventh Amendment doctrine have been critical to defining the immunity. The first episode was the drafting of the amendment, and the
second was the Supreme Court's decision in Hans v Louisiana.
During both, the immunity developed to shield state treasuries
from potentially crushing liabilities.
The states originally drafted the amendment in order to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over suits against states by citizens of other states or by foreigners. After Chisholm, the states
feared that they would be liable to British creditors and American
Tories whose property the states had confiscated during the war.
Two treaties that the United States had negotiated with the British at about that time further heightened the states' concerns. 90 In
90

In the Treaty of Paris, the Americans had agreed that "creditors on either side, shall

meet with no lawful impediment" to the recovery of prewar debts, Treaty of Paris, Art IV,
Sep 3, 1783, 8 Stat 80, 82, and that the Congress would "earnestly recommend" that the
states restore confiscated property, id, Art V, 8 Stat at 82. Because of the liabilities that
such a treaty imposed, however, most of the states had refused to comply. John V. Orth,
The Judicial Power of the United States 16-17 (Oxford, 1987).
Following Chisholm, another treaty, Jay's Treaty, Arts II, IV, Nov 19, 1794, 8 Stat 116,
117, 119-20, was negotiated. Like the Treaty of Paris, it provided for repayment of money
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response, the states speedily ratified the amendment. 1 Although
there is some dispute as to whether the amendment changed the
provisions of Article III or just restored its original meaning,92 it is
clear that the purpose of creating the amendment was to protect
the states from having to pay back war debts. The precipitating
event was not doctrinal reasoning based on any abstract theory of
the nature of Article III, but rather a very specific concern that the
states would face liabilities that they could not, or would not, pay.
History confirms this very specific and restricted purpose of
the amendment. Once the crisis over the Revolutionary War debts
had passed, the Court gave the amendment very narrow scope."
And the Court did not take steps to strengthen the Eleventh
Amendment immunity until the occasion of another major political
crisis a hundred years later, also involving repudiation of
debts-this time, those of the Old Confederacy.
At this second critical episode in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court broadly read the amendment in order to protect the Southern states from paying debts owed on bonds that
they had issued just before the Civil War. At this time, out-of-state
bondholders were selling their rights to in-state citizens in order to

owed to English creditors, but the states still feared liability for Revolutionary War debts.
Orth, JudicialPower at 17-18. This speeded ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. Id at
20. The Amendment "put to rest fears that the national government.., had any interest in
enforcing against the states demands for payments in specie of Revolutionary War bills of
credit." Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1934 (cited in note 27).
91 Orth, JudicialPower at 20 (cited in note 90). Gibbons explains that the Amendment
originally included language that removed from its scope cases that arose under treaties
made under the authority of the United States. This language was eventually eliminated.
Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1933 (cited in note 27). Although Gibbons ultimately argues
that the treaty language was surplusage given the language of the final amendment, the
removal of that language does show the very specific political motivation behind the amendment. Congress was acutely aware of the nexus between the peace treaties and the proposed
amendment. Id at 1934-36.
92 See Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1893-94 (cited in note 27). See also Martha A. Field,
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 126 U Pa L Rev 515,
516 n 8 (1977). Field makes the observation that the Court's view of the doctrine in this way
raises two concerns. First, it is by no means clear what the original intent of the framers
was. Id at 527-35. Second, Field believes that the Court has misread Article III as imposing
sovereign immunity as a constitutional requirement on the federal government, as opposed
to simply leaving unimpaired the common law requirement of sovereign immunity that antedates the Constitution. Based on the latter view, Field believes that sovereign immunity is
"subject to modification or even abandonment by processes short of constitutional amendment." Id at 538. It could be said, however, that the structure of Article III is such that by
limiting federal judicial power, it preserves for the states their original sovereign immunity.
" See, for example, Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 412 (1821); Osborn v
Bank of the United States, 22 US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824); Orth, JudicialPower at 7 (cited in
note 90). But see Governor of Georgia v Madrazo, 26 US (1 Pet) 110, 124 (1828).
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circumvent the Eleventh Amendment. Both the President and
Congress believed that forcing the Southern States to pay the
bonds could cripple the states' economies and touch off a national
crisis. The President made it clear to the Supreme Court that he
would not enforce any judicial decree ordering the states to pay on
the bonds. With the prospect of such a constitutional crisis looming, the Court decided Hans, which extended the states' protection
94
against lawsuits to suits by in-staters.
Both the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the
amendment and those surrounding the dramatic expansion of its
scope in 1890 show that the animating force of the immunity is the
need to protect states from crushing liabilities. Although there may
be some dispute over whether the immunity's protection extends
to all liabilities, its history suggests that protecting the states from
the burdens of trial was never a consideration.
B. The Eleventh Amendment as a Jurisdictional Bar
Writing for the majority in Edelman, Justice Rehnquist stated
that Eleventh Amendment immunity "sufficiently partakes of the
nature of a jurisdictional bar" that failure to raise it as a defense at
trial does not result in waiver.9 5 Viewing the Eleventh Amendment
as a jurisdictional bar has important implications for determining
whether the Eleventh Amendment immunity is a right not to stand
trial.
The Eleventh Amendment is analytically akin to a jurisdictional bar because the current doctrine describes the immunity as
a limitation of the judicial power under Article III. In a 1973 concurring opinion,9 Justice Marshall stated that Article III was the
root of the constitutional impediment to the exercise of federal judicial power to entertain a case by a private individual against a
state.97 According to Marshall, the issue addressed by Eleventh

Ortb, JudicialPower at 8 (cited in note 90).
Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 678 (1974).
" Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri v Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 US 279, 287 (1973) (Marshall concurring).
11 According to Marshall:
[D]espite the narrowness of the language of the [Eleventh] Amendment, its spirit has
consistently guided this Court in interpreting the reach of the federal judicial power
generally, and "it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the
entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suits brought by private parties against a state without consent given ... not even
one brought by its own citizens because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification."
Id at 292 (Marshall concurring), quoting Ex parte New York, 256 US 490, 497 (1921).
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Amendment immunity is not the general immunity of the states
from private suit, but rather the susceptibility of the states to suit
before federal tribunals. When characterized. as a limitation of the
power of the federal judiciary, Eleventh Amendment immunity
seems quite similar to a jurisdictional bar.
At first glance, it may seem that dragging a party before a tribunal that is powerless to bind the party to its judgment might
create the kind of damage that could not be vindicated after trial."8
Nevertheless, this type of situation arises whenever a party challenges a court's jurisdiction, and the Court has consistently held
that a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is not
immediately reviewable. For example, in Catlin v United States,9 9
the Court stated that a denial of a motion to dismiss, "even when
the motion is based on jurisdictional grounds, is not immediately
reviewable." In Van Cauwenberghe v Biard,0 ° the Court characterized both claims of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
claims of a lack of personal jurisdiction as "the right not to be subject to a binding judgment of the court."
Van Cauwenbergheprovides some explanation for this view of
jurisdictional defenses. In Van Cauwenberghe, the Court had to
determine whether an order denying a motion to dismiss based on
an extradited person's claim that he was immune from process was
immediately appealable. The petitioner had been extradited to the
United States on charges of wire fraud. While in the United States,
some angry investors in one of his deals that went sour filed a civil
suit against him. The petitioner argued that since he was in the
United States solely because of extradition, he was immune from
civil suit. The district court denied the motion and the petitioner
appealed. Citing Cohen and Mitchell, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
affirmed. 10
The Court considered whether the assertion that a court lacks
personal jurisdiction because of immunity from service of process
entails the right not to stand trial. The Court concluded that it did
not. The due process considerations that underlie the exercise of
personal jurisdiction protect a person only from being subject to

98 See, for example, Marx v Government of Guam, 866 F2d 294 (9th Cir 1989). Where
foreign sovereign immunity is involved, one factor that the courts often consider is the indignity of bringing a sovereign before a tribunal powerless to adjudicate the claim.
" 324 US 229, 236 (1945).
.0.486 US 517, 527 (1988).
101 Id at 517-19.
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the binding judgment of a forum with which he has no meaningful
ties. These considerations do not create a right not to stand trial.
The Court explained that "petitioner's challenge to the District
Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction because he is immune
from civil process should be characterized as the right not to be
subject to a binding judgment of the court." 10 2 Further, "[b]ecause
the right not to be subject to a binding judgment may be effectively vindicated following final judgment,.., the denial of a claim
of lack of jurisdiction is not an immediately appealable collateral
order.' 10 3 Van Cauwenberghe shows that the purpose of a jurisdictional defense is to prevent a party from being bound by a judgment of a forum that has no authority to enforce it. It is not meant
to spare a party the burdens of litigation.
To the extent the Eleventh Amendment is like a jurisdictional
bar, therefore, it should be characterized as a right not to be bound
by a federal judgment. Thus, an interlocutory order denying that
right should not be immediately appealable.
C.

The Young Fiction

It may be argued, however, that the Eleventh Amendment has
an underlying policy that is different from mere jurisdictional limitations. Words like jurisdiction and immunity are, after all, just
labels. Ultimately, courts must determine whether immunity from
trial is an animating force or not."" As a result, they must determine the interests that trigger the bar. One way to do this is to
analyze the Young fiction.
To what extent is the Young fiction useful as a gauge of the
underlying interests of the Eleventh Amendment immunity? In
most cases involving Eleventh Amendment immunity, the party
suing the state will name a state official in the complaint rather
than the state alone. Plaintiffs rarely name the state as a defendant. Thus the central question in Eleventh Amendment doctrine is
whether the state is the real party in interest. By looking at the
answer to this question, it is possible to determine the underlying
policy of the immunity.
In Edelman, the Court attempted to develop a way to determine whether a state was the real party in interest. The plaintiffs
sued Illinois officials claiming that they had illegally delayed

102

Id at 526-27.

103 Id at 527.

'04 Lutz v Secretary of the Air Force, 944 F2d 1477, 1482 (9th Cir 1991).
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processing applications for a federal assistance program. The result, according to the plaintiffs, was to deny payments to the eligible claimants during the delay. 10 5 The Court held that the plaintiffs could sue for injunctive relief requiring the state to process
the applications. 06 However, it denied the plaintiffs' request for an
order requiring the state officials to pay them money that had been
wrongfully withheld. 10 7 Such money payments were barred because
"[t]he funds to satisfy the award in this case must inevitably come
from the general revenues of the State of Illinois, and thus the
award resembles far more closely the monetary award against the
State itself . . . than it does the prospective injunctive relief
awarded in Ex Parte Young."'' 0 Under this rule, the Eleventh
Amendment allows suits that seek prospective relief but does not
allow suits that seek compensation for past injury that will be paid
from the state treasury.
The Court tightly defined the type of relief that invokes Eleventh Amendment immunity. Under the Edelman standard the
Eleventh Amendment bars only those suits in which plaintiffs seek
an award equivalent to a damages award. 09 Even forms of equitable relief that have a concrete but ancillary effect on the state treasury will not make the state the real party in interest."' Under
this standard, the Eleventh Amendment truly operates as an immunity in only a very narrow sense. It protects states only from
paying out compensatory judgments.
The Edelman decision represents the Court's attempt to reconcile the Eleventh Amendment immunity with other constitutional rights and privileges. By drawing a distinction between prospective and retrospective relief in order to determine whether the
Eleventh Amendment immunity is triggered, Edelman.provides a
clear way to determine when the concerns for state sovereignty
outweigh other constitutional considerations. The sovereignty interest that the distinction between prospective and retrospective
relief protects is the states' interest in being free from paying com-

105 415 US at 653-59.
100

Id at 664.

107 Id.

108Id at 665.
109 This explanation of the Young fiction as modified by Edelman can account for all
cases except those in which a private individual sues a state directly and names the state as
the party in the complaint. In such a case the retrospective/prospective distinction is irrelevant and the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit. As a practical matter, however, such a
situation never arises.
" Edelman, 415 US at 668.
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pensatory judgments from their treasuries. So conceived, Edelman
reveals a core interest of the immunity-protecting the state
111
fisc.
Nevertheless, protecting the state treasury from compensatory
judgments may not be the only interest underlying Eleventh
Amendment immunity. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v
Halderman,112 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred a suit in which the plaintiff sought injunctive relief that
would force state officials to comply with state law. In Pennhurst,
the Court explained that the Young fiction gives federal courts a
way to hold state officials responsible to the "supreme authority of
the United States." 1 3 Where there is no violation of a federal
right, the Court reasoned, there is no need for this fiction. If the
plaintiff does not allege that the state officials have violated federal
law, the Eleventh Amendment bars even injunctive relief that
poses no threat to the state treasury. Under this conception, Eleventh Amendment immunity apparently protects states from liability even when their state treasuries may not be at risk.
Although in Pennhurst the Court expanded Eleventh Amendment immunity beyond cases where the state fisc was threatened,
implicit in the Court's rationale is a conception of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a right not to be bound by a federal
judgment rather than as a right not to appear before a federal tribunal. The Court focused on the effect that a federal judgment
would have on the state in determining whether the Eleventh
Amendment immunity protected the state." 4 And nowhere did the
Court characterize the immunity as an immunity from suit.
As the Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine has developed, the concerns of federalism have come to outweigh other interests in only a very narrow context. State sovereign immunity5
outweighs other interests, according to Edelman and Pennhurst,"
only when a federal judgment would force a state to pay damages
from its treasury or would force its officials to comply with its own
"I In fact, the core interest may be even more narrow. In Milliken v Bradley, 433 US
267, 288-90 (1977), the Court ordered a state to spend money from the state treasury in
order to finance remedial programs to counteract the effect of past segregation. It is difficult
to reconcile Milliken with Edelman. But Milliken suggests that Edelman is limited to cases
where the defendant seeks compensation for a past wrong.
112 465 US 89 (1984).
113 Id at 102.
114 Id at 113-14 (discussing judicial intervention in terms of the effect the injunction
would have on the state, and not the effect the trial would have on the state).
"' See also Green v Mansour, 474 US 64, 68 (1985). In Green, the Court seemed to
embrace the type of balancing approach that it initiated in Pennhurst.
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laws."' In either case, the state's interest can be vindicated on appeal from a final judgment. Consequently, the immunity seems like
a defense to liability rather than a right not to stand trial.
When a district court denies a motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds, the state will incur litigation costs
that it may not recoup on appeal. But that kind of hardship has
never been sufficiently compelling to warrant an immediate appeal.1117 Any error in a district court's order may promote delay and

the additional expenditure of judicial and private funds, but such a
hardship cannot warrant immediate review. Otherwise, a party
would be entitled to an immediate appeal any time he faced an
adverse ruling. The interests of judicial efficiency must outweigh
this interest." 8 That is the concern at the heart of the final judgment rule.
CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court has recently shown more deference to states' rights by strengthening the Eleventh Amendment
immunity, the Court still confines the immunity's scope to a discrete area of interest-when a suit threatens the state fisc or when
a suit seeks to force a state official to comply with state law. With
this in mind, the position taken by the First Circuit in Libby seems
more consistent with current jurisprudence surrounding the Eleventh Amendment and the collateral order doctrine. The history
and theory of the Eleventh Amendment show that the interests
underlying the immunity would not be compromised should the
state be forced to litigate. Because a state would not have to worry
about paying a compensatory judgment until after trial, the immunity is properly considered a defense to liability.
A claim that the Eleventh Amendment creates an immunity
from suit ignores the way that the Supreme Court has restricted
the operation of the Eleventh Amendment in the federal system.
Shaped by a compromise .between states' rights and individual
rights, Eleventh Amendment immunity reflects the tension between those concerns. While the immunity undoubtedly protects
the states, the precise nature of this protection does not justify exI Pennhurst, 465 US at 104-06.
.. See Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678, 694-98 (1978).
1'8 See Lauro Lines v Chasser, 490 US 495, 498 (1989), quoting Richardson-Merrell
Inc. v Koller, 472 US 424, 436 (1985) ("The possibility that a ruling may be erroneous and
may impose additional litigation expense is not sufficient to set aside the finality requirement imposed by Congress. .. ").
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cepting the states from the requirements of the final judgment
rule.

